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IS THERE A CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY FOR 
GOVERNMENT TO ASSURE PUBLIC HEALTH? 
Todd Caldis† 
Public Health Law: Power, Duty, Restraint.  By Lawrence O. 
Gostin.  University of California Press, 2001.  491 pages.  $24.95 
 
The initial chapters of this book were originally published as a 
series of articles entitled  “Public Health Law in a New Century” in 
the Journal of the American Medical Association.1  The book, which is 
addressed primarily to an audience of public health professionals 
and lawyers, may be regarded as a fuller exposition of its author’s 
conviction that public health law should be more than a supporting 
player in public health efforts of the 21st century. 
Gostin provides a complicated definition of public health law, 
which amounts essentially to the study of government’s legal 
powers and duties to assure conditions of population health 
through the identification and prevention of risks.  The book 
contains some discussion of tort law and administrative law as tools 
of public health law, but in accord with its definition of public 
health law most of the analysis pertains to constitutional law.  
Government at both the state and federal levels is shown to have 
broad power to pursue programs to affect the public’s health 
subject to important procedural and substantive protections for 
private rights of liberty and property.  Gostin also argues that the 
federal government has a positive constitutional duty to promote 
public health, a notion that is likely to resound with public health 
 
 †  J.D. 1979, University of Minnesota; Ph.D. candidate, Health Services 
Research, School of Public Health, University of Minnesota. Mr. Caldis had his 
own general law practice in St. Paul for 20 years and remains a member of the 
Minnesota Bar. His current reasearch is in health economics, seeking to estimate 
quality-adjusted HMO cost functions, and is being conducted with the support of 
the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. 
 1. Lawrence O. Gostin, Public Health Law in a New Century: Part I, 283 J. AM. 
MED. ASS’N 2837-41 (2000); Lawrence O. Gostin, Public Health Law in a New 
Century: Part II, J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2979-84 (2000); Lawrence O. Gostin, Public 
Health Law in a New Century: Part III, J. AM. MED. ASS’N 3118-22 (2000). 
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professionals, but that is certainly beyond the boundaries of 
recognized constitutional doctrine. The strengths and weaknesses 
of Gostin’s constitutional approach to public health law and how 
his presentation of relevant constitutional law might work for 
different types of readers are the criteria on which evaluation of 
this book depends. 
Gostin likely regards a constitutional grounding as the most 
useful foundation for considering the legal status of future 
accretions to public health powers and responsibilities.  
Increasingly public health scholars and practitioners are adopting 
an ecological model of disease transmission which assigns especial 
importance to alleged social causes of disease such as human 
inequality. Since interventions to address such social risk factors 
would involve redistribution of resources, it would be surprising if 
these new approaches fit neatly into the traditional constitutional 
order without impinging on conventional notions of government 
responsibility, individual rights, and property rights.  No matter 
what one’s stance is toward such new directions for public health 
and no matter whether one is a lawyer or a public health 
professional, constitutional law is a logical starting place for 
considering the legal viability of such interventions. 
It is likely, however, that non-lawyer readers of this book will 
take away a distorted perception of constitutional law. Gostin refers 
to the place of “public health in the constitutional design” as if 
public health now holds some special position when in fact it is 
merely one of an infinity of objectives Congress may choose to 
pursue under the aegis of its enumerated powers.  An argument 
from the preamble to the U.S. Constitution is likely to be especially 
confusing for previously untutored readers.  Although the 
preamble has never been recognized as the source of any federal 
constitutional power, it is cited by Gostin as evidence of federal 
general welfare powers that are then deduced to include public 
health.  An exaggerated estimate of where public health fits into 
existing constitutional arrangements may be agreeable or flattering 
to readers who work in public health, but it does not reflect 
currently established law and to suggest otherwise sows potentially 
dysfunctional preconceptions about the priority that may be 
asserted for public health agendas. 
On the other hand, the book may fix misperceptions that can 
arise in legal education about the extent of government power.  
For lawyers who obtained the misimpression in their law school 
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courses that individual rights almost always prevail over 
government policies with which they conflict, much of Gostin’s 
exposition will be a salutary corrective.  Even in the bad old days 
when courts were striking down legislation because it conflicted 
with a putatively inviolable freedom of contract and substantive due 
process rights, the courts nevertheless deferred to legislative acts 
genuinely addressed to public health objectives despite attendant 
burdens on businesses or private individuals.  What held true in the 
earliest cases, such as the classic compulsory immunization case 
handed down early in the twentieth century, holds true today in 
cases like those that uphold compulsory HIV testing for public 
workers.  Coercive government efforts to address public health 
problems are likely to be upheld by the courts provided that the 
requirements to be enforced are not invidiously discriminatory or 
do not unduly burden the enjoyment of fundamental rights. 
Although the author expresses qualms about how public 
health policies may impinge upon private interests (especially 
rights of personal autonomy and other civil liberties), he endorses 
the legitimacy of existing governmental powers to pursue public 
health objectives.  Any other position would appear incongruous 
when juxtaposed with his claim that government may have an 
affirmative constitutional duty to pursue public health, a duty 
presumably prior to and more encompassing than the people’s 
elected representatives have so far imagined.  He anticipates public 
health interventions that are still more intrusive toward individual 
rights and individual behavior than those now in place and 
dismisses as naïve those who tell themselves that public health and 
individual rights are always mutually reinforcing objectives. 
What Gostin says about the idea of positive government duties 
to promote public health is contained in a few pages discussing the 
“negative constitution,” the traditional proposition that that despite 
broad potential powers the government has no affirmative duty to 
assure for individuals the conditions of life, liberty, or property 
except to the extent settled upon through democratic processes.  
Although he does not explicitly advocate abandonment of the idea 
of a negative constitution, he is critical of it.  His essential premise 
seems to be that large government institutions that already exist 
have fundamentally changed the constitutional environment and 
require the recognition of still broader government duties. Because 
government already does a lot, it has created expectations that it is 
responsible for a whole range of additional issues and situations, 
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and attempts to abjure responsibility are likely to be the result of an 
underlying discriminatory purpose.  One clear example is 
government-funded health services for the poor that do not 
include abortion services.  The implication of these points is that 
Gostin wants recognition of at least some positive government 
duties to advance public health, though he does not make clear 
how far he would like to go supplanting the principle of a negative 
consititution. 
Given the broad constitutional power the legislative branch 
already possesses to establish public health objectives, it will be 
hard for some readers to fathom how recognition of affirmative 
governmental duties would genuinely expand the constitutional 
power behind public health.  The only apparent utility would be as 
a prod to other branches of government by creating wider options 
for pushing a public health agenda through the courts whenever 
the legislative and executive branches of government are perceived 
to be neglectful or otherwise unable to deliver results on such 
priorities, a possibility that Gostin does not really discuss.  And 
although he acknowledges that precedent is against his views, no 
mention is made of the profound shift in power away from the 
democratically-elected branches of government that adopting his 
views might entail or the fiscal pressures that might be unleashed if 
positive duties for federal government action were generally 
recognized.  Federal courts have enforced affirmative duties in 
extraordinary circumstances when fundamental constitutional 
rights have been at risk such as in the racial desegregation cases, 
and state courts on occasion will attempt to enforce affirmative 
duties textually recognized in their constitutions such as the right 
to an equal public education.  But it appears that the kind of 
doctrine advocated by Gostin would reach far beyond such 
important special cases which themselves have generated enduring 
controversy about alleged judicial excesses.  In advancing the 
position that he does, however tentatively, Gostin owed it to his 
readers to sketch why he believes obviously relevant countervailing 
considerations may be ignored. 
A similar incompleteness characterizes Gostin’s discussion of 
paternalism as a basis for public health laws.  He holds, for 
example, that we should not attempt to justify seatbelt and 
motorcycle helmet laws out of some “strained” conception of 
general public welfare; instead he urges us to recognize and accept 
such laws for what they really are: paternalistic coercion of private 
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individuals by government for the benefit of those same private 
individuals.  Such paternalism may not be problematic if it is the 
outcome of a democratic political process in which elected 
representatives have acted subject to constitutional protections for 
individuals.  But Gostin has posited the possible existence of 
affirmative government duties to promote public health 
independent of democratic processes, in which case the issue of 
paternalistic law is likely to be more problematic.  Who is to guard 
paternalistic guardians who are insulated from democratic 
processes? 
Public Health Law: Power, Duty, Restraint conveys a distorted 
picture of the constitutional dimensions of public health law to 
readers not otherwise equipped with a background in 
constitutional law.  For those readers who do come equipped with 
an appropriate background the book raises the idea of recognizing 
constitutional duties to assure the conditions of public health, but 
ignores important issues connected to what would be important 
changes in long settled constitutional doctrine. Perhaps in 
attempting to address disparate audiences the author was not able 
to do full justice to either. 
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